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ABSTRACT: The past decade has seen a major increase in the production of energy from biomass.  The growth has 
been mirrored in an increase of serious biomass related accidents involving fires, gas explosions, combustible dust 
explosions and the release of toxic gasses. There are indications that the number of bioenergy related accidents is 
growing faster than the energy production.  This paper argues that biomass accidents, if properly investigated and 
lessons shared widely, provide ample opportunities for improving general hazard awareness and safety performance 
of the biomass industry.  The paper examines selected serious accidents involving biogas and wood pellets in 
Denmark and argues that such opportunities for learning were missed because accident investigations were 
superficial, follow-up incomplete and information sharing absent.  In one particularly distressing case, a facility saw a 
repeat accident, this time with fatal outcome, still without any learning taking place.  The paper presents some 
information on other biomass accidents in Denmark, mostly involving biogas from anaerobic digestion.  Details are 
lacking however, precisely because the accidents were insufficiently investigated and results not communicated.  The 
biomass industry needs to pay more attention to safety.  Utmost care should be taken to avoid so-called media- 
shifting i.e. that the resolution of a problem within one domain, the environmental, creates a new problem in another, 
the workplace safety domain. 





The views of this paper run along three main lines of 
arguments:  
 that currently, the biomass industry gives 
insufficient attention to safety and major 
accident hazards;  
 that sub-optimalities have to be addressed, 
particularly those related to so-called media-
shifting; and,  
 that accident prevention opportunities are 
foregone due to superficial investigation when 
accidents do take place, because root causes are 
not identified and sharing of lessons learned is 
limited or absent. 
 
1.1 Insufficient attention to safety 
The number of major accidents in the bioenergy 
production and raw materials supply chain is not only 
increasing but seemingly growing faster than the quantity 
of energy produced [1].  Safety problems deserve more 
serious consideration and safety, in a general context, is 
worthy of being treated as an actual component of 
sustainability [2].  
Biofuels have been the subject of continuous research 
work world-wide. Earlier studies have argued however, 
that apart from e.g. material compatibility issues, only 
limited consideration has been given to safety [2].   
Several reasons for this state of affairs have been 
offered [3]:  
(1) It is commonly believed amongst biofuel 
manufacturers that process safety can be achieved merely 
by application of common sense;  
(2) There is inconsistency in applicable regulations;  
(3) There are low skills and competence issues 
associated with the entry of new manufacturers; and 
(4) There is limited information available on the 
process hazards and minimal appreciation on the risk 
involved in the production of the biofuels 
Other authors argue that due to perceived simplicity 
of the chemical process, attention to safety is frequently 
omitted as is basic safety training of the personnel [4] and 
that poor safety culture is an issue [1].  For biogas 
production in particular, safety challenges and 
sustainability issues have become a concern [5].   
 
1.2 Safety, a legitimate objective in industry? 
Co-incidentally, the call-for-papers to this EUBCE 
2017 international biomass conference provides support 
to the basic argument of this paper, that there is little 
attention to safety and limited appreciation of hazards in 
the biomass industry.   
To classify conference contributions, the organizers 
have compiled a list, which as per April 2017 had 470 
keywords entries.  The topic of safety is conspicuous by 
its absence – there is not a single keyword related to 
safety in this long list.   
The closest match is "security". Security measures 
relate to physical protection however, such as 
safeguarding an asset from unauthorized access and acts 
of malevolence.  Security is much different from safety 
[6].  The following standard keywords related to biomass 
safety are absent in the list: safety, accident investigation, 
fire, combustible dust explosion, ATEX, emergency 
response, firefighting, oxygen depletion, off-gassing, 
toxic gas hazard, hydrogen sulfide and carbon monoxide.   
This is remarkable bearing in mind that the 
conference has global attendance, with 800-900 
contributions from 3800 authors from 80 countries.   
 
1.3 Media-shifting 
Environmental interventions may be undertaken with 
insufficient attention paid to workplace safety [7], [8]. 
Two types of sub-optimalities can be identified:  
1) media shifting, which occurs if the 'resolution' of a 
problem within the environmental domain gives rise to 
new, and unforeseen, problems within other domains, 
specifically the workplace safety domain; and  
2) a missed opportunity, which occurs if an 
opportunity exists for improving both environmental and 
occupational health and safety performance, but a less 
optimal solution is chosen that only addresses 
environmental performance. 
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1.4 Accident investigation and learning 
Having paid the price of an accident, we should use 
the opportunity to learn from it.  Entire books have been 
dedicated to learning from accident case stories in the 
process industry [9]–[11].  The benefits of such learning 
are obvious – to avoid repetition, and to share the lessons 
learned in order to minimize the number of times the 
same lessons have to be learned.  
What is not so obvious, however, is how to make this 
seemingly simple and straightforward idea work in 
practice [12], [13]. This challenge is reflected in common 
aphorisms, such as Santanyana’s: Those who cannot 
remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
 
1.5 Causes 
The search for accident causes has been likened to 
peeling an onion [14].  The skin represents the immediate 
technical causes but beneath lies layers and layers of 
underlying causes such as weaknesses in the management 
system, each contributing with important insights for 
prevention.  Much theory exist on this subject, e.g. [15], 
[16].  It suffices here to stress that both immediate and 
underlying causes should be sought after an accident.   
As will be argued later in this article, the biomass 




2 METHOD AND MATERIALS 
 
The first sections of the paper examine three serious 
Danish biomass accident case stories in detail.  The case 
stories have been selected for their following 
characteristics: 
(1) They have major accident potential, resulting in 
fatal or near-fatal injury and they clearly have multiple 
fatality potential. 
(2) They were poorly investigated, with direct causes 
being only superficially identified or not identified at all, 
and underlying organizational issues ignored. 
(3) There is sparse information on the etiology of the 
accidents in open sources, in some cases resulting in 
basic facts being inaccurate or misleading.   
(4) Repeat accidents took place at a later stage.   
Primary sources are, unless otherwise indicated, 
dockets of the Danish Working Environment Authority 
and the police obtained through the Danish equivalent of 
a Freedom of Information Act.  Media reporting may 
serve as supplementary sources. 
 
 
3 ACCIDENT 1: EXPLOSION OF BIOGAS 
DIGESTER 
 
3.1 The digester  
In 1990, a biogas digester at Vejle municipal 
wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) in Denmark 
exploded.  The anaerobic digester processed regular 
municipal sewage sludge.    
At the time, the WWTP had four anaerobic digesters, 
one gasholder tank and one tank for processed sludge.  
Digesters #3 and #4 were identical and built in the early 
1970s using concrete slipform construction methods.  A 
rectangular building between the two digesters held 
shared technical installations and access stairways.   
The digesters were vertical cylinders with a cone 
shaped roof and a cone shaped bottom.  An upper 
horizontal ring beam between the cylinder and the top 
cone helped distribute structural loads. In a cut-through 
drawing (fig. 1), the digester would appear as a hexagon.   
A circular cavity wall circled the digester.  Leca-
blocks were used for the inner-wall and masonry red 
brickwork for the outer wall.  For architectonical and 
decorative purposes, the circumference of the outer brick 
wall was interrupted every five meters or so by slender 
concrete columns in series of three to break visual 
monotony.  The columns were purely decorative and 
carried no load.  
At the upper part of the digester tank, a parapet 
provided circumferential structural support to a 
horizontal roof deck.  The circular cavity between the 
horizontal deck and upper cone of the digester served as a 
utility corridor for pipes and other technical installations.  
The parapet was an extension of the circular exterior 
wall, which covered the digester's thermal insulation.  
The parapet continued vertically above the upper ring 
beam and extended about 1 m above the horizontal roof 




Figure 1: Part of cross-sectional drawing of the accident 
biogas digester.  The blue arrow marks the horizontal 
ring beam.  The yellow arrow and dotted line mark the 
roof deck supported by a parapet.  Five contractors were 
present at the roof doing asphalt roofing work when the 
explosion took place.  Drawing courtesy of Krüger, 
Denmark. 
 
3.2 Roofing work 
Digesters #3 and #4 were in need of roof repairs.  For 
reasons that are no longer known, asphalt roofing was 
decided upon.  This type of roofing material is a 
membrane made of a felt or fiberglass mat saturated with 
bitumen.  The roofing material is applied using a propane 
fired torch which partly melts the bitumen mixture on the 
underside of the membrane and glues it to the roof. 
 
3.3 Prior planning of roof work 
Planning of the roof work started more than two 
months in advance.  A project team was assembled and at 
least one meeting was held with representatives from the 
roofing contractor, the WWTP, the Danish Working 
Environment Authority, the municipal fire department, an 
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external occupational health and safety specialist from a 
large engineering consultancy, and others. 
Work would start on Digester #4.  The following 
procedure was agreed upon: 
 No new sludge to be fed to the digester two 
weeks before the work was to commence  
 All roof hatches to be opened one week before 
the work, in order to gas free the digester 
(natural ventilation) 
 All roof hatches to be sealed closed and valves 
to the neighboring digester 3, and other biogas 
systems, to be locked closed. 
 While the work is carried out, any surplus gas 
in the digester to be vented to a safe location.  
A hose, length 8-10 m, to be fitted to the 
digester's open 8" top vent valve.  The hose to 
terminate at the perimeter and extend no less 
than 3 m above the roof.  Bio methane is lighter 
than air and hence buoyant, which would 
ensure safe natural dispersion. 
 Al all times should the hose outlet be 
downwind the work site, to keep the worksite 
free of gas 
 At all times should an explosimeter be at the 
worksite. The work must stop immediately if 
flammable gasses are detected (alarm level 15 





Figure 2:  Aftermath.  The accident Digester #4 center, 
the identical and apparently undamaged digester #3 to the 
right.  The digester's roof deck collapsed and two roofing 
contractors fell down 11 m.  At least one of the 
decorative concrete columns fell onto the gasholder tank 
behind the accident digester at center left (arrow)..  Note 
persons for scale at center right (arrow).  Photo courtesy 
of Vejle Amts Folkeblad. 
 
3.4 The explosion 
In the early morning of the third workday, on August 
22, 1990, Digester #4 exploded.  At the time of the 
explosion, five contractors were present doing asphalt 
roll roofing work.   
The explosion either blew the parapet away or 
dislocated it, causing it to collapse (Fig. 2).  With the 
peripheral structural support gone, the horizontal roof 
deck with the workers on top also collapsed (Fig. 3).  
Two workers fell 11 m and landed in the debris zone 
below.  They suffered very seriously injuries, inter-alia 
serious head trauma.  They survived but with debilitating 
permanent injuries.   
Two workers suffered minor injuries as they fell "to a 
lower level", probably because they managed to cling 
onto what remained of the roof deck.  Miraculously, one 




Figure 3:  The collapsed roof deck.  A small section of 
the remains of the parapet, which provided structural 
support to the roof deck, is just visible to the left (arrow).  
Photo courtesy of Vejle Amts Folkeblad. 
 
3.5 Cause 
The investigation soon identified the cause.  The hose 
fitted to the digester's 8" top vent valve was a simple 
flexible duct similar to those commonly used for household 
kitchen ventilation purposes – a plastic cover over a metal 
wire coil to shape a tube (Fig. 4).  The hose did indeed 
terminate at the perimeter of the digester and was indeed 
elevated to a height of 3 m, but the hose was lying on the 
roof, unprotected.  In a moment of inattention, a worker 
had grazed the flexible hose with his propane burner torch 
– the plastic had melted and the gas inside ignited.  There 
was no flashback arrestor in the line and the flame could 
travel back into the digester, causing an explosion there. 
 
3.6 Ignorance 
A contemporary occupational health and safety 
magazine [17] expressed an almost heartbroken 
frustration with the fact that a glaringly obvious hazard 
was overlooked by all participants.  Indeed, with the 
benefit of hindsight, gross ignorance in the planning 
phase is evident.  Such ignorance however, when 
realized, is a prime candidate for information exchange of 
lessons learned and insights gained to prevent repeat 
accidents. 
Basic combustion engineering knowledge regarding 
flammability limits seems to have been absent in the 
planning phase.  The decision to open the top hatches in 
an attempt to free the digester of flammable gas is 
particularly distressing.  Mixtures of gas and air will burn 
only if the fuel concentration lies within well-defined 
lower and upper bounds referred to as flammability 
limits.  Had the top hatches not been opened and air not 
entered the digester, the gas in the digester would not 
have been in the ignitable range.  With no ingress of air, a 
flashback into the digester would not have been possible 
and an explosion could not have taken place. 
 




Figure 4:  The "glaringly obvious hazard" (with the 
benefit of hindsight).  The standard flexible duct of the 
same type commonly used for household kitchen 
ventilation purposes hangs from the roof (arrow), torn 
and burnt.  It was fitted to the top valve to vent excess 
digester gas.  The propane torch of an asphalt roofing 
contractor grazed the flexible duct, ignited the gas inside, 
and the flame flashed back into the digester, leading to 
explosion.  Photo courtesy of Vejle Amts Folkeblad. 
 
 The decision to free the digester of flammable gas by 
opening the top hatches and rely on natural ventilation 
was also ill conceived.  Although pure bio-methane 
indeed is lighter than air, and hence is buoyant, biogas is 
not.  Significant quantities of carbon dioxide are created 
by the same anaerobic microbial processes that produce 
bio-methane, the typical volumetric concentration is 
about 1/3.  The carbon dioxide molecule is denser than 
air and as a result, (dry) biogas often has a near-neutral 
density relative to air.  It is not particularly buoyant and 
will mix only slowly with stagnant air. 
The project team seems to have been singularly 
concerned with the risk for ignitable gas at the 
workplace, presumably because the main hazard 
identified was sources of ignition: the naked flame of the 
propane torches.  The team's mental model of hazards 
seems to have been limited to where ignition sources 
were present, ignoring the hazard of ignitable gas inside 
the digester.  This may reflect traditional explosion 
protection thinking prevalent at the time, which 
concerned itself with classification of areas to facilitate 
the proper selection and installation of εx (epsilon-x) 
classified electrical equipment to be used safely in those 
areas – i.e. to reduce the probability of ignition.  Only 
with the ATEX Directive introduced later came a broader 
risk analysis based approach, the so-called safety 
principles, which directs attention to first, preventing the 
formation of flammable atmospheres, second, to reduce 
the chance of ignition, and third, to mitigate the severity 
of the consequences.   
Mistakes in execution are also evident.  The decision 
to use a standard flexible duct similar to those commonly 
used for household kitchen ventilation purposes is 
disturbing as is the practical implementation, with the 
hose lying directly on the roof, unprotected.  The asphalt 
roofing contractors seem to have been clueless about 
hazards. 
 
3.7 Forgotten  
The accident is important not only for the lessons 
learned it provides, but also for the fact that basic 
knowledge about the event has passed into oblivion only 
25 years after having taken place [18].   
In 2014, a Google search for the accident would 
come back empty.  The search tool REX at the Danish 
National Library would find nothing.  Nor would 
Infomedia, a Danish proprietary search engine and media 
article repository that tracks about 1,900 Danish media. 
In 2014, the staff at Vejle WWTP knew the accident 
had taken place but no one had any personal knowledge 
of the event and written records no longer exist. 
Access to the records of the Danish Working 
Environment Authority and the police was requested 
through the Danish equivalent of a Freedom of 
Information Act.  The docket obtained from the Working 
Environment Authority appears to be incomplete 
however, there is no investigation of the accident itself, 
only minutes of the many meetings held later, when 
asphalt roofing work was to be carried out on Digester 
#3.  The police informed that their docket had been 
transferred to the Viborg branch of the Danish National 
Archives.  With regrets, they informed that the docket 
could not be located, the archive box was empty.  
Two specialist magazines with limited circulation 
each carried an article on the accident [17], [19].  The 
magazines could be retrieved only with much effort. 
News media coverage was available at the microfiche 
archive at the Danish National Library in Copenhagen.  
Upon request, the regional newspaper Vejle Amts 
Folkeblad kindly retrieved photos from their archives and 
made them available for publication.  
Perhaps the starkest evidence of oblivion is a 2012 
safety document for a large Danish biogas facility 
covered by the EU Seveso Directive (lower-tier).  In 
sweeping statements, the facility's safety document 
asserts that the literature is silent on biogas accidents. 
 
3.8 Learning processes? 
As stated above, ignorance, when realized, is a prime 
candidate for information exchange of lessons learned 
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and insights gained to prevent repeat accidents.  
Opportunities for learning after the 1990 digester 
explosion appear to have been wholly missed however.  
Lindberg et al. [20] offer a description of the CHAIN 
model for experience feedback, which comprise six 
activities (1) reporting, (2) selection, (3) investigation, (4) 
dissemination, (5) prevention, and (6) evaluation.  
The model summarizes well-known concepts from 
the literature and underlines that learning from past 
accidents is truly a chain in the sense that the process as a 
whole fails if any one of its links fails. 
In the 1990 Vejle accident some of the early links in 
the chain failed – and the accident was simply forgotten. 
 
3.9 Repeat accidents 
The French ARIA database [21] offers a brief 
description of a biogas digester explosion in Peschiera 
Del Garda (Italy) on March 12, 1997, which appears to 
share many similarities with the 1990 Vejle accident.   
The site was a municipal wastewater treatment plant, 
the digester was made of concrete and roof "repair 
works" were being carried out.  The accident description 
simply says that "residue gas" was present in the digester.  
Welding ignited the gas and the concrete digester 
exploded.  Two workers were thrown from the roof and 
killed.  A third worker fell into the digester and was 
seriously injured.  There is no description of the 
circumstance and of lessons learned, if any.  
In 1976 a concrete biogas digester exploded in 
Åkeshov (Sweden).  A picture is provided in [22] and 
large chunks of concrete at the base of the tank indicate 
that either the wall or the roof has been severely 
damaged.  There are no details.  
Even cursory reporting of repeat accidents is 
compromised if incomplete or absent reporting of biogas 
accidents is the norm rather than the exception.  Not 
much is known about the propensity to report.  
Experience from Denmark, detailed below, suggests that 
reporting is very poor indeed. 
 
3.10 Value of information sharing  
An accident investigation report with detailed 
analysis of causes, consequences and a rich discussion of 
how to prevent repeat occurrences is of obvious value to 
operators of similar units elsewhere and to the general 
community of safety professionals.   
Even rudimentary knowledge that a certain type of 
accident has occurred in not without value either.  
Designers of anaerobic digesters have educated this 
author on why internal explosions in digesters are 
implausible, if not impossible.  Most of their assertions 
were based on coherent technical rationales such as lack 
of oxygen in the headspace, that digesters are heated and 
the high humidity and large amount of water vapor in the 
headspace inerts the atmosphere there, that sources of 
ignition are absent, etc.  But assertions could also be less 
sophisticated: "it has never happened" or "never heard of 
it".  The mere knowledge of the existence of past 
incidents can cool such complacency. 
Knowledge of past accidents can also help populate 
the list of possible scenarios and consequences to 
consider in risk analysis work.  One generic risk analysis 
scheme for off-site risk assessment [23] include harm 
from emissions (i.e.. leaks) only, as does the generic 
ATEX approach in [24]. Own work (unpublished) and 
circumstantial evidence from cursory media reporting 
[25] suggest that blast overpressure from an internal 
explosion in a digester or a gas holder might also be 
relevant accident scenarios for off-site risk assessment.  
A third generic risk analysis scheme [26] for biogas risk 
assessment ignores the risk for H₂S poisoning, even 
though such fatal accidents have occurred.  Additional 
unusual consequences may be considered.  In 1976, for 
example, two sewage storage tanks exploded; the tank 
failed catastrophically and the gush of sludge killed a 
teenager and seriously injured an adolescent who were 
fishing nearby [27].  The unusual consequence is 
drowning in sludge. 
 
3.11 Other Danish biogas incidents  
Starting in 2003, the Danish Safety Technology 
Authority has issued an annual report with a list of 
accidents involving flammable gasses, biogas included. 
The reports are partly based on mandatory self-reporting 
of accidents that meet certain severity characteristics.  
The Authority also monitors news media reporting, based 
on automated screening of keywords.  The authority does 
not investigate accidents.   
A review of the Annual reports for 2003-2016 yields 
one biogas accident (years 2014 and 2015 are not 
included, reports were not available at the Authority's 
website): On Sept 2, 2005, at Hemmet a covered tank 
with degassed manure from a biogas digester "exploded".  
The biogas is believed to have been ignited by a 
powertool, when an employee drilled holes in the exterior 
tank wall to attach a fitting.  There were no casualties.  
There are no details as to why gas was present outside the 
tank or the nature of the damage caused by the explosion.  
The brief description is probably based on media reports, 
which are notoriously inaccurate. 
The supplementary information below is based on 
media reporting retrieved through Infomedia (a 
proprietary Danish media article repository) or Google. 
On December 2, 1999, at Ribe, a severe storm caused 
a digester to collapse.  The digester damaged a 
neighboring tank, probably another digester, and partly 
crushed to buildings.  There are no details. 
Late July 2002, a lightning strike had damaged the 
flare at Blåbjerg biogas.  While the flare was out of 
service, waiting for spare parts, venting of (unburnt) 
excess biogas led to neighbor complaints about foul 
odors.  An inspection by the municipality the day the 
flare was taken back into service discovered a "torn 
membrane" and a "faulty valve", which had leaked foul 
biogas for at least 1½ weeks.  Details are hazy. 
On Jan 8, 2005, the outer protective membrane of a 
double membrane gas storage holder at Blåbjerg Biogas 
in Nørre Nebel was torn and dislodged in a storm.  There 
was no damage to the inner membrane and no release of 
biogas. 
Around March 20, 2007, the outer protective 
membrane of a double membrane gas storage holder at 
Hashøj biogas collapsed in a storm.  The storm dislodged 
the blower duct and overpressure was lost.  A week or so 
earlier, a batch of Norwegian "wood oil" had killed the 
microbes in the digester, hence the inner membrane 
contained little or no gas.  When overpressure was lost, 
the outer membrane collapsed.  Apparently, the two 
membranes were not damaged. 
Early September 2013 a silo with dried sludge at 
Bjergmarken WWTP exploded.  It appears to be self-
ignition and a subsequent pyrolysis gas explosion, i.e. 
biogas was not involved.  There are no details. 
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On May 25, 2014, a biogas storage in Thorsø "burned 
down". Seemingly, an inflatable double membrane gas 
storage holder was ignited by a blower motor, which 
caught fire due to an electrical short (personal 
communication).  Details are hazy however, and the 
information should be viewed with caution. 
On August 6, 2015, several people were overcome by 
hydrogen sulfide fumes at Hashøj Biogas while 
unloading food waste.  Media reports misstate the gas as 
NOX and garble other basic facts.  This author is in the 
process of preparing an article on this very serious 
accident. 
On November 29, 2015, the storm "Gorm" severely 
damaged the exterior insulation on digesters at Holsted 
biogas.  There was no release of biogas. 
On May 20, 2009, give and take a few days, a biogas 
powered public transportation bus caught fire at Jernbane 
Allé, Vanløse.  The fire services doused the bus with 
copious amounts of water but were much relieved when 
they learned that biogas (not fossil gas) was involved.  
"At no time was the situation particularly dangerous, 
biogas does not ignite so easily", they said.  
It would probably be a mistake to discard this 
comment as a mere competence issue.  It may well reflect 
widespread deep-seated simplistic and astonishingly 
naïve beliefs that "green" and "sustainable" fuels are less 
hazardous than their fossil fuel equivalents.   
This may indeed be the nub of the problem with 
limited appreciation of the major accident hazard 
potential of biomass fuels. 
 
 
4 ACCIDENT 2:  FATAL DUST EXPLOSION AT 
WOOD PELLET FACILITY CAUSED BY WHEEL 
LOADER (REPEAT ACCIDENT) 
 
4.1 The facility 
A facility located in Aars, Denmark, produced wood 
pellets from a wide number of waste products, mostly 
shavings from furniture production, waste streams from 
the processing of grains, and energy crops [28]. 
Raw materials were received and stored in a building.  
Conveyors transported the raw materials to a mill in 
another building.  After milling, a conveyor dropped the 
(wood) dust of a specific raw material into one of several 
storage bays.  According to recipe, wheel loaders moved 
material from different bays to a mixing table, which fed 
the wood pellet press. 
 
4.2 Dust explosion hazards 
The wood dust in the storage bays is combustible and 
presents a risk of dust explosions.  When handled, 
biomass pellets also generate fine dust in quantities that 
pose a risk for dust explosions.  There are numerous 
reports of fires and explosions involving biomass pellet 
manufacturing and handling [8]. 
A dust explosion is the rapid combustion of fine 
particles of combustible material suspended in the air.  
Dust explosions can either be primary or secondary.  A 
primary dust explosion occurs when a small suspension 
of combustible dust is ignited and explodes.  A secondary 
explosion occurs when dust, which has been allowed to 
settle and accumulate on floors or other surfaces, is made 
airborne by the pressure wave of primary explosion and 
subsequently ignited by the slower moving flame front.  
Depending on the extent of the dust deposits, a weak 
primary explosion may cause very powerful secondary 
dust explosions.   
Dust explosion hazards can be difficult to recognize 
by lay persons because the undisturbed atmosphere 
presents as free of dust and the workplace, when 
superficially inspected, may falsely appear dust free, 
overlooking dust deposits in e.g. hard to reach overhead 
areas.   
Dust explosions have traditionally been difficult to 
deal with in industry. Part of the problem lies with the 
limited general understanding of the complex mechanism 
of dust explosions among plant operating personnel as 
well as corporate management. 
 
4.3 Explosion in 2002 
The facility began production of wood pellets in May 
2001.  The facility experienced a severe explosion in one 
of the storage bays on March 27, 2002.  The roof was 
blown away, a light concrete wall was pushed outwards 
and a section of the wall had been toppled.  The building 
was a complete loss.  At the time of the explosion, a 
forklift driver was present inside.  The forklift's cabin 
protected him from the effects of the explosion and he 
was able to flee unharmed.  
The forensic technicians of the police investigated 
and concluded that an unidentified foreign body had 
entered the mill and generated a spark that ignited dust at 
the mill outlet.  The fire then triggered a dust explosion in 
the storage bay.  A specialist company was called to 
examine the spark detection system, but found no 
technical fault.  Specialist fire scene investigators from an 
external company found no technical fault in the 
electrical installations which resulted in the same 
conclusion as the police – the explosion was caused by a 
spark.  
The facility was rebuilt to the original blueprints, 
with minimal modifications.  
 
4.4 Repeat explosion in 2010 
On September 16, 2010, the facility experienced a 
new explosion, in the same building, and almost at the 
same location, when a Volvo wheel loader grabbed a 
bucket of wood dust in a storage bay.  Within seconds, 
the floor in the bay was on fire and the flames almost 
instantly expanded to fill the entire compartment.  The 
fire then triggered a dust explosion, which damaged the 
roof and blew out wall panels.  The intense fireball killed 
the driver of the wheel loader.  Another worker present 
inside the building was injured.  The building was a 
complete loss (Fig. 5).   
Already the following day, the police informed the 
public that that the cause of the explosion was identified.  
Due to a weld failure, the universal (cardan) joint, a 
power transmission component, broke loose under the 
vehicle and damaged nearby electrical cables.  Electrical 
shorts and arching ignited airborne dust, which resulted 
in a combustible dust explosion, concluded the police 
[28]. 
The manager of the facility expressed emotion and 
disbelief, as the facility was in full compliance with the 
most recent norms and guidelines.  In theory, this 
explosion should not be possible at all, he said. 
As will be discussed later however, mere compliance 
with rules and regulations is no guarantee that the facility 
is safe. 
 




Figure 5:  Light damage.  The many fiber cement roofing 
panels and wall panels that remained in place indicate 
that the dust explosion overpressure was modest.  The 
dust explosion severity certainly could have been worse.  
Photo courtesy of Beredskab Vesthimmerland. 
 
4.5 Real cause of the 2010 explosion 
Later analysis [28] has identified serious flaws in the 
swift police investigation and has argued that the real 
cause was a failure by the driver to release the parking 
brake, which then overheated and ignited airborne dust.   
This difference of argument is no banality, no trivial 
hair-splitting objection.  If the cause is a random 
breakdown due to a hidden weld defect in a hard to reach 
mechanical component, very little indeed can be done to 
prevent recurrence.  If the cause is an overheated parking 
brake however, there are major implications for accident 
prevention efforts because it suggests that this type of 
wheel loader is entirely unsuitable for locations where 
potentially explosive atmospheres of combustible dust 
exist.  
In fact, it can be argued that the accident has broad 
learning potential because of the widespread usage of 
front loaders in environments with combustible dust, the 
innocent nature of the human error and the severity of the 
consequence. 
 
4.6 Root cause not identified 
The safety principles of the ATEX Directive direct 
attention to first, preventing the formation of flammable 
atmospheres; second, to reduce the chance of ignition, 
and third; to mitigate the severity of the consequences.   
These principles pay intellectual debt to the earlier 
concept of inherent safety, which Kletz [29] was the first 
to clearly articulate.  Ashford [7] later argued that 
inherent safety is similar in concept to pollution 
prevention.  Inherent safety, sometimes referred to a 
primary prevention, relies on preventing the possibility of 
an accident.  By comparison, secondary prevention relies 
on reducing the probability of an accident.  Mitigation 
seeks to reduce the seriousness of the consequences, i.e. 
injuries and damage to the environment or property. 
Ashford [30] observes that a bias in the engineering 
profession, a failure to address inherent safety and 
primary accident prevention, is one of the reasons why 





Figure 6:  Superficial investigation.  A specialist police 
vehicle inspector examines the accident Volvo wheel 
loader shortly after the dust explosion.  Tires are burned 
away and windows in the cabin melted.  Upon learning 
that the universal (cardan) joint had failed, he erroneously 
concluded the explosion was caused by a mechanical 
failure due to a concealed weld defect.  This finding 
closed the police investigation, as there was no indication 
of wrongdoing, only of bad luck.  The inspector is 
looking in the wrong place for causes however.  In fact, 
the underlying cause are in the storage bays just visible in 
the background.  Why design the wood pellet facility 
with a buffer storage of 500 t of combustible wood dust?  
It was convenient to store the dust, but not essential to do 
so.  Had the ATEX safety principles been applied, the 
buffer storage, and hence the fuel source and the potential 
for severe dust explosions, would have been eliminated. 
Source: Police investigation and the Danish Working 
Environment Authority. 
 
Had the safety principles been applied during the 
investigation of the explosion in 2002, and again in 2010, 
attention would have been directed towards the 
soundness of having a buffer storage of 500 t of 
combustible wood dust (Fig. 7).  It was convenient to 
store the dust, but not essential to do so.  A superior 
design philosophy (from the point of view of safety) 
would be to mix raw materials according to production 
recipe and immediately process wood dust from the mill 
into pellets, eliminating the need for buffer storage, and 
eliminating a major source of fuel for dust explosions. 
 




Figure 7:  The real cause.  Two of the storage bays that 
comprised the 500 t wood dust buffer storage.  Photo 
courtesy of Beredskab Vesthimmerland. 
 
4.7 Evidence of learning? 
The 2002 explosion was a highly significant incident 
as it gave clear evidence of the inherent hazards of wood 
dust and was an opportunity to re-consider the soundness 
of having a large buffer storage of combustible wood 
dust.  So was the 2010 explosion.   
Both opportunities for learning were missed however, 
because the investigation was carried out by law 
enforcement officers, who were narrowly concerned with 
compliance with regulations, negligence, wrongdoing and 
culpability.   
There is no evidence of new insights gained, no 
attempts to share basic accident information amongst 
workplace inspectors or amongst peers within the wood 
pellet industry.  The accident investigation was super-
ficial and information sharing absent.  There is no 
evidence of learning whatsoever.   
Had the company chosen to rebuild the facility, 
which this time they did not, a future repeat explosion in 
the storage bay area would be likely. 
 
4.8 Ignorance 
Law enforcement officers have neither training nor 
technical background in industrial accident investigation.  
In fact, their natural (but narrow) concern with 
negligence and wrongdoing is entirely misplaced in a 
perspective of learning from accidents.  Assigning them 
to this task is a policy mistake. 
Ignorance is also evident at the managerial level.  As 
stated earlier, simplistic beliefs that compliance with 
rules and regulations ensures a high level of safety are 
misplaced and naïve.  Had management requested a risk 
analysis?  Was management aware of dust explosion 
cases elsewhere in industry?  Probably not. 
Ignorance is also evident at the designer level.  Why 
design a facility with a 500 t buffer storage of 
combustible dust, thereby setting the scene for future 
serious dust explosions?  The designer appears to have 
been concerned with secondary prevention, on reducing 
the probability of ignition.  Was the designer aware of 
dust explosion cases elsewhere?  Probably not.  There is 
not much literature on the subject, there is little 
information sharing in the biomass industry.   
 
4.9 Repeat accidents 
A safety professional from a large Belgian company 
kindly shared notes on past accidents.  It appears that a 
Volvo loader was involved in a "dust explosion in bunker 
followed by fire" on February 15, 2008.  Another Volvo 
loader appears to have been involved in a "storage fire" 
in February 2010.  The accidents appear to have taken 
place in Belgium or perhaps Holland.  There is no further 
information.  
This may be of some significance, because the Volvo 
loader in the 2010 explosion in Aars, Denmark, had a 
particular handbrake design, which made it susceptible to 
overheating if the driver failed to release the handbrake 
[28].  This is pure conjecture however, and the absence of 
data does not warrant any further speculation.  
There was a dust explosion in a warehouse at 
Kalundborg Havn on March 7, 2012 while loading a 
truck with imported wood pellets.  The truck driver, who 
was standing outside the warehouse next to his truck, 
sustained superficial burns.  Pellets in the warehouse 
were moved with a wheel loader.  Evidence indicates that 
the explosion took place inside a cup elevator however, 
and that the wheel loader was not involved.  It was 
speculated that a foreign body had become stuck in the 
cup elevator, creating a spark.  Wood pellets in bulk are 
carried in multi-purpose general cargo vessels and 
remnants of the vessel's prior cargo often end up in the 
pellet import.  Hence, foreign bodies "wood, rods, metal 




5 ACCIDENT 3:  FATAL CARBON MONOXIDE 
POISONING OF TWO SEAMEN 
 
5.1 Carbon monoxide off-gassing hazard 
Freshly produced wood pellets may emit a range of 
gasses such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, 
methane and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that 
can accumulate in storage confinements and reach 
dangerous levels [31].  The release of the highly 
poisonous and odorless carbon monoxide is of particular 
concern.  In addition, freshly produced wood pellets may 
deplete the atmosphere in storage confinements of the 
oxygen required to sustain life [32]. 
This section examines the death of two seamen 
aboard the vessel AMIRANTE due to carbon monoxide 
poisoning.  
 
5.2 Danger in cargo holds of marine vessel 
Wood pellets are often shipped in bulk in marine 
vessels to their final destination.  Problems with oxygen 
deficiency and dangerous levels of carbon monoxide in 
the cargo hold of marine vessels at sea have been known 
for over a decade [33] and the gasses have been 
responsible for many accidents.   
The International Maritime Organization 
IMO/SOLAS has recently revised its guidance on 
entering enclosed spaces aboard ships in response to the 
ongoing problem of confined space incidents [34].  The 
guidance provides examples of enclosed spaces such as 
fuel tanks, ballast tanks, cargo pump rooms (used on e.g. 
chemical tankers), etc. – i.e. compartment that are not 
routinely accessed by ordinary seamen.  
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5.3 Gasses travel and reach rooms routinely accessed  
In the Danish accident below, the seamen were 
poisoned, not in the cargo hold, but in a room, which was 
part of the normal working areas of the ship and routinely 
accessed.  Important lessons of this accident are that 
dangerous gasses from the cargo hold can migrate and 
reach rooms considered safe.   
As will be shown, this lesson and opportunities for 
learning were wholly missed.  Accident descriptions in 
the public domain are hazy and basic facts are corrupted.   
 
5.4 The accident 
In the afternoon of July 15, 2009, during the passage 
of the Baltic Sea, two of the vessel's crew decided to 
enter the vessel's forepeak compartment.  The forepeak is 
a stowage room at the bow of the ship, which is reached 
from the deck through a stairwell.  The forepeak was 
used for miscellaneous storage: paints, ropes, etc.   
The reason why the two seamen entered the forepeak 
is not known.  Likely, the forepeak offered a convenient 
refuge for a clandestine cigarette break, out of sight of the 
tough captain. 
Unknown to them, poisonous carbon monoxide 
gasses from the cargo hold had travelled to the forepeak 
through a crevice in a door that separated the front cargo 
hold compartment and the forecastle (Fig. 8).  When the 
seamen did not show up for dinner, a search was 
initiated, which found them lifeless in the forecastle.  
 
5.5 Investigation 
The vessel was close to Danish territorial waters.  
The captain radioed the Danish authorities requesting 
immediate medical assistance and the vessel redirected to 
the port of Rønne, Bornholm.  The police was waiting at 
the quay and began a standard crime scene procedure.   
The criminal investigation found no evidence of 
criminal intent and was satisfied that the two seamen had 
received the proper safety instruction for working in 
enclosed rooms.  The investigation was closed as there 
was no indication of wrongdoing, only of bad luck. 
Important questions aimed at understanding why the 
accident happened were not raised.  Were the crew aware 
of hazardous properties of the cargo?  Was the forepeak 
considered a compartment with properties similar to 
those of enclosed cargo spaces?  In all likelihood the 
crew were clueless about the danger [32]. 
 
5.6 Information sharing? 
Because the police opened the case a crime scene 
investigation, the case was technically registered as a 
criminal case.  In Denmark, criminal cases are kept 
confidential in order to protect the privacy of the 
individuals concerned.  As a result, very little 
information, if any, relevant to accident prevention 
professionals is available in open sources.   
 
5.7 Basic facts corrupted, no learning 
It is true that there is sporadic and passing mention of 
the AMIRANTE accident in the wood pellet literature, 
e.g. [35], [36] but descriptions are hazy and basic facts 
are corrupted.  This is also true for the papers produced 
by authors in Denmark.  For example, a report [37] states 
that the seamen entered the cargo hold, which they did 
not, and a paper [38] states that they died from asphyxia, 
which is also wrong.  
Because proper sharing of correct information about 
an accident is a basic precondition for learning it is 
concluded that learning processes were derailed at a very 




Figure 8:  The door in the forepeak compartment, which 
led the front cargo hold.  The door had three closing 
hinges but only two were engaged.  Gasses travelled from 
the cargo hold to the forepeak through a crevice where 
the third hinge (arrow) was not engaged.  Source: Police 
investigation. 
 
5.8 Systemic deficiency by design 
The accident was investigated as a criminal case and 
the legal system is so designed that findings are kept out 
of reach of safety professionals and the general public.  
This approach has been criticized at an earlier occasion as 
being entirely misplaced in an accident prevention 
context [28].  It is a systemic deficiency by design – the 
bureaucratic judiciary system did not malfunction, it 
worked precisely as intended.   
The flag state, St. Vincent & The Grenadines, did not 
investigate.   
There is no evidence of learning whatsoever.  Repeat 





This paper presents cases in support of the view that 
learning processes to prevent repeat biomass accidents 
are impeded, dysfunctional or entirely absent in 
Denmark. 
 Knowledge about an explosion of a biogas 
digester passed into oblivion.   
 A wood pellet facility experienced a 
devastating dust explosion. The accident was 
insufficiently investigated and root causes 
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relating to principles of inherent safety were 
not identified.  As a result, a repeat explosion 
took place eight years later, this time with fatal 
outcome.   
The case offers a textbook example of the 
truism that if accidents are not investigated, and 
root causes not identified, accidents recur. 
 Knowledge about a fatal carbon monoxide 
accident was kept out of reach of safety 
professionals and the general public.  
Information in open sources are hazy and basic 
facts are corrupted.   
 
Currently, there appears to be a substantial untapped  
potential for learning and information exchange. This 
potential should be exploited for the renewable energy 
and environmentally friendly biomass pellet industry also 
to become sustainable from a worker safety perspective. 
This paper suggests that structural barriers exist at 
three levels: 
(1) Production/managerial level:  Biomass units are 
often installed at agricultural enterprises that are 
unfamiliar with gas processing technology, combustible 
dusts and poisonous gasses.  Farmers assume tasks of 
process operators and gas engineer, tasks for which they 
have little or no training.  The limited information 
available in open sources on accidents at Danish biogas 
units indicate that limited appreciation of process dangers 
and the finer details of ATEX hazards play a role. 
(2) Institutional level.  Accident investigations are 
tasked with the police. But law enforcement officers have 
neither training nor technical background in industrial 
accident investigation.  In fact, their concern with 
negligence and wrongdoing is entirely misplaced in a 
perspective of safety.  Assigning them to this task is a 
policy mistake.  As a result, there is no information 
sharing, or learning, and repeat accidents take place. 
(3) Policy level.  Danish environmental ambitions are 
very high and the institutions involved are on a mission 
to fight global climate change problems in order to secure 
our common future.  They are on a mission to save the 
world, nothing less.  In such a global perspective, sight is 
easily lost of the environment of the workers.  Safety 
issues are absent, downplayed or waved away in white 
papers and visionary policy reports, even though 
interventions can run counter to long established core 
principles of inherent safety and risk reduction [8], [39].   
In 2016, Denmark topped the World Energy 
Councils' so-called trilemma index that takes into account 
three parameters: 1) environmental sustainability, 2) 
energy security, and 3) energy equity.  Denmark ranked 
1st on the World Energy Councils' global list, not only 
overall but also in terms of excellently balanced trilemma 
performance resulting in an outstanding triple–A grade 
[40].   
The costs to society are breathtaking [8]. In this 
setting, the general failure to address safety risks appears 
particularly disheartening.  Further research is needed to 
provide policy guidance on how to improve this situation.  
There is currently no serious mechanism to register 
biomass accidents.  At a practical level, a natural starting 
point would be to rectify this shortage of fundamental 
data.  Systematic incident information capture and 
exchange, understanding the fundamental root causes, 
widely disseminating the lessons learned, and integrating 
these lessons learned into safe operations, are key to 
improving the safety performance of the expanding 
bioenergy industries. 
Utmost care should be taken to avoid so-called 
media- shifting i.e. that the resolution of a problem within 
one domain, the environmental, creates a new problem in 
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